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1. Introduction
Professor Regan’s paper on theUS–Poultry (China) case provides highly interesting
insight both into the facts of the case and the Panel’s reasoning, as well as the
broader systemic issues lurking behind them. The author has identiﬁed a number of
thought-provoking aspects in a case that, at ﬁrst glance, appears to be a relatively
bland SPS dispute.
It is a pleasure and privilege to provide comments. I will address China’s
‘conditional’ consultations request (II), the application of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 to
Section 727 (III), Article 4 and ‘equivalence’ (IV), Article 5.5 and the ‘appropriate
level of protection’ (V), and Article XX of the GATT 1994 (VI).
2. China’s ‘conditional’ consultations request
With respect to China’s ‘conditional’ consultations request, I agree with Professor
Regan’s characterization of the issue as ‘the sort of tangle only lawyers can create’,
a tangle that to some might epitomize the less attractive, excessively legalistic side of
WTO dispute settlement.1 However, I should like to add a further point to his
analysis, a point that arguably explains why China phrased its consultations
request in somewhat unusual ‘conditional’ terms. (Indeed, as I note below, other
complainants have previously opted for the very same approach in at least two
other disputes, although these disputes never reached the panel stage. Hence,
China’s approach was anything but outlandish.)
* The views set forth here are attributable to the author alone and are not those of the Advisory Centre. The
author would like to thank Lukasz Gruszczynski and Don Regan, as well as other friends and colleagues,
for valuable comments.
1 Professor Regan’s article, Section 3.1.
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China’s consultations request clearly reﬂects the wish to prioritize its GATT
claims over any SPS claims. Indeed, China expressly stated in the consultations
request that it did not consider Section 727 to be an SPS measure at all. But if China
did not want to bring a case under the SPS Agreement, why would it ‘conditionally’
request consultations, and contemplate claims, under that Agreement? Why not
leave these claims out of the consultations request altogether?
It is always risky to speculate on a party’s motivations and thought processes,
but a likely explanation is that China was concerned that, if the United States were
to argue that Section 727 was an SPS measure and the Panel agreed, or if the Panel
found on its own motion that Section 727 was an SPS measure, the Panel might
consider that a challenge against Section 727 should have been brought under the
SPS Agreement and not only under the GATT. Put differently, the question is:
Where a complainant seeks to challenge an SPS measure (or what appears to be an
SPS measure), does the complainant have a choice between bringing a challenge
under the SPS Agreement (and maybe also under the GATT 1994) or bringing a
challenge exclusively under the GATT 1994? Can a complainant choose not to
challenge an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement at all and instead bring a claim
under the GATT 1994 alone?
Before answering that particular question, it may be useful to pause and
inquire why a complainant would want to choose to go under the GATT
alone, rather than under the SPS Agreement (possibly combined with the GATT, in
which case the Panel’s analysis would, however, focus on the SPS Agreement as the
more ‘speciﬁc’ agreement). One reason is that the choice between the SPS
Agreement and the GATT 1994 makes a potentially big difference in the allocation
of the burden of proof. If the measure is an import ban (as in the US–Poultry
(China) case), a violation of Article XI of the GATT will be easily established and
any scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for the ban will have to occur under Article XX. Under
Article XX, the burden of proof falls on the defendant – in this case, the United
States. This might appear as an attractive proposition for the complainant. In
contrast, under the SPS Agreement, it is the complainant that bears the burden of
making a prima facie case of a lack of scientiﬁc justiﬁcation under Articles 2.2 and
5.1. In this dispute, the burden of proof under the SPS Agreement was, of course,
on China.
Of course, a complainant will not base its preference between the GATT and the
SPS Agreement solely on the burden of proof.2 There are other considerations, too.
It is of course true that the SPS Agreement offers lines of attack against a measure
that the GATT does not offer. A measure that is not supported by science, but is at
the same time not discriminatory and not an import ban, will likely not violate the
GATT – but it would violate the SPS Agreement. Similarly, blatant inconsistencies
2 Some might say that the signiﬁcance of the allocation of the burden of proof is generally overstated in
WTO dispute settlement. This is probably true, but it does remain of practical signiﬁcance.
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between levels of protection may violate Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement, but may
not violate the GATT. In those situations, the SPS Agreement is, from the
complainant’s vantage point, ‘superior’ to the GATT. However, there will be other
cases – for example those involving straightforward, unscientiﬁc import bans such
as Section 727 that do not even look like an SPS measure at ﬁrst glance –where a
complainant might prefer a simple, lean case under the GATT, with a challenge
under Article XI, rather than delving into the SPS Agreement. The requirement of
scientiﬁc evidence – a very pertinent element for ‘necessity’ under Article XX
(b) –will still remain relevant, but a violation will be established quickly under
Article XI, and the onus will be on the defendant: in this case, to convince the Panel
that what appears to be a budget measure actually has a health-protection purpose
and, if so, is supported by scientiﬁc evidence.
China likely had these considerations in mind when it prioritized its GATT claim
over any claim under the SPS Agreement. It is also useful to consider certain
idiosyncrasies of the case – Section 727 was bound to expire and China may have
been interested in establishing a general precedent, a ‘slap on the ﬁnger’ of the US
Congress, as it were, rather than a complex and multilayered set of ﬁndings under
the SPS Agreement. This all the more so as, for all China knew, any successor
measures to Section 727 could look quite different than Section 727 (and indeed the
successor measures did look different), such that complex and protracted litigation
about Section 727 under numerous SPS provisions would have been of limited use
for shaping US behaviour upon compliance.
But nowwe return to the above question – could China simply opt for the GATT,
and not bring claims under the SPS Agreement, if Section 727 was an SPS measure?
Does the SPS Agreement not only enable, but also oblige a complainant to
challenge an SPS measure under the SPS Agreement? Is it a ‘lex specialis’? Case law
has not yet told us.3 The relationship between the various WTO agreements
remains a thorny bundle of issues, with numerous sub-topics, whose depths the
case law has only begun plumbing.4 There may be good arguments on both sides
3What is clear from the case law is that, if both agreements are invoked, the legal analysis would start
with the more speciﬁc agreement, that is the SPS Agreement. Appellate Body Report, United States – Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS257/
AB/R, adopted 17 February 2004, DSR 2004:II, 571, para. 134. The most recent statement of the above
proposition was by the Panel in United States –Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale
of Tuna and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/R, circulated to WTO Members 15 September 2011 [adoption/
appeal pending], para. 7.40. This is precisely what the Panel did in this case.
4 One of the most salient sub-issues is, of course, the applicability of Article XX of the GATT to non-
GATT agreements and provisions, an issue that has been subject to debate both in the case law and in
academic debate. See Appellate Body Report in China –Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/AB/
R, adopted 19 January 2010, which applied Article XX to China’s obligations in China’s Protocol of
Accession. Appellate Body Report, China–Publications and Audiovisual Products, paras. 205–233. See
also Panel Reports, China –Measures Related to the Exportation of Various RawMaterials, WT/DS394/R
and Corr.1, WT/DS395/R and Corr.1, WT/DS398/R and Corr.1, circulated to WTOMembers 5 July 2011
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whether an SPS measure must be challenged under the SPS Agreement. However,
from a litigator’s perspective, the existing uncertainty requires carefully hedging
one’s bets and including claims under the SPS Agreement in the consultations
request, even if the complainant still prefers to prioritize its GATT claims and
would prefer not to raise any SPS claims at all. In the contrary case, it cannot be
excluded that a panel would reject the case for jurisdictional reasons.
The layered wording of the Chinese consultation request, in my view, responds
precisely to the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between the SPS
Agreement and the GATT 1994, as well as China’s wish to prioritize its GATT
claims. The conditional nature of China’s consultation request is therefore, in my
view, more than just a quirk or infelicitous drafting. China’s ﬁrst choice was to
pursue its case under the GATT. For that reason, China raised claims under the
GATT and also argued that Section 727 was a budgetary measure, not an SPS
measure. At the same time, for the reasons noted above, China had to provide for
the contingency that the Panel found the measure to be an SPS measure and that, as
an SPS measure, it had to be challenged under the SPS Agreement (with or without
the GATT), rather than under the GATT alone. Hence China’s conditional request
under the SPS Agreement.
One can, of course, wonder about China’s seemingly quick volte-face, and its
decision to assert claims under the SPS Agreement, at the ﬁrst oral hearing, once the
United States argued that the measure at issue pursued a public-health objective.
Of course, this decision does not necessarily shed much light on China’s decision
(from several months earlier) to write a conditional consultations request –China’s
assessment and strategy may have simply changed during those months. But even if
we draw some indications from the ‘volte-face’, it is clearly a highly speculative
exercise to decide what precisely China’s later decision tells us. China may have
considered that the goalposts had now changed because a public-health purpose
had been asserted by the United States. Even if the United States did not claim
outright that the measure was an SPS measure, there were good reasons to consider
Section 727 to be an SPS measure.5 China may have thought that the Panel would
examine that issue and that there was little prospect in convincing the Panel that
the SPS Agreement did not apply. And, China may have reasoned, if the Panel were
to take the view that SPS measures must be challenged under the SPS Agreement,
China had to act quickly and ﬁle its SPS claims immediately, at the ﬁrst oral
[appeal in progress], in which the Panel refused to apply Article XX to another provision in China’s
Protocol of Accession. Panel Reports, China–Raw Materials, para. 7.159.
5 In addition to the Panel’s, as well as Professor Regan’s convincing analysis as to why Section 727 was
an SPS measure, see also the discussion in Lukasz Gruszczynski (2011), ‘United States: Certain Measures
Affecting Imports of Poultry from China – Just Another SPS Case?’, 2:3 European Journal of Risk
Regulation, 432, 435. Moreover, the deﬁnition of an SPS measure is to a large extent based on the health-
protection purpose of a measure, and once a defendant claims such a purpose, it becomes more difﬁcult for
a complainant to credibly assert the contrary.
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hearing – ﬁling them later would have disqualiﬁed such claims. China could have
admittedly put up a greater ﬁght on this point, if it had felt strongly about avoiding
the SPS Agreement. But perhaps it did not feel strongly, and it did not want to
spend its credibility on an issue that did not matter all that much. China may also
have changed its strategy and decided that ﬁndings of violation of the SPS
Agreement were now desirable, after all. In any event, in an area as complex and
under-interpreted as the relationship between the WTO agreements, it is quite
difﬁcult to look inside a complainant’s head, as it were.
All in all, as convoluted as the ‘conditional’ approach in its consultations request
may seem, China’s strategy was understandable. Interestingly, China was anything
but the ﬁrst complainant to submit a ‘conditional’ consultations request under the
SPS Agreement. There are at least three other disputes on the WTO docket where
the complainant took the very same approach as China, namely WT/DS270, WT/
DS271, and WT/DS284, in which claims were worded as GATT claims and SPS
claims appear only as conditional. These disputes never reached the panel stage, so
China’s approach merely happens to be the ﬁrst one to become subject to a panel
ﬁnding.6
The Panel’s analysis and rejection of the United States’ arguments is entirely
correct. To some, the United States’ objections may reﬂect what one would expect
from a thorough and aggressive procedural defense. However, leaving aside its
excessive formalism, the United States’ view, if accepted, would lead to absurd
results, as the Panel explained. The United States was undoubtedly aware of
this and could not possibly expect to prevail. Speciﬁcally, the United States’
approach would create two contradictory strands of case law, as the Panel noted.
Under the ﬁrst strand of case law, certain claims could be brought even if they
were not mentioned at all in the consultations request (under the criteria set out
in the Appellate Body Report in Mexico–Anti-Dumping Measures on Rice7
and repeated by the Panel Report in China–Publications and Audiovisual
Products8); under the US–Poultry (China) strand of case law (as advocated by
the United States) claims could not be brought even if they were expressly raised
in the consultations request – simply because they were phrased ‘conditionally’.
This amounts, in my view, to unwarranted formalism that makes the life of
complainants miserable for no obvious reason – in an adjudicative regime that is
6 See WT/DS270/1 and WT/DS271/1, which identify the SPS Agreement as a relevant agreement
‘should Australia assert that the measure is an SPS measure’. In turn, WT/DS284/1 states that ‘[i]f the
measures listed above are sanitary or phytosanitary measures as deﬁned in the SPS Agreement, they would,
in the view of Nicaragua, not be consistent with’.
7 Appellate Body Report, Mexico –Deﬁnitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Beef and Rice, Complaint
with Respect to Rice, WT/DS295/AB/R, adopted 20 December 2005, DSR 2005:XXII, 10853, para. 138.
8 Panel Report, China –Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WT/DS363/R and Corr.1, adopted 19 January
2010, as modiﬁed by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 7.115.
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already, by its very procedural design and its remedies, not excessively
complainant-friendly.9
Finally, theremay be yet another reasonwhy admitting the ‘conditional’ nature of
China’s consultation request as sufﬁcient under Article 4 of the DSU is necessary
and important. Appellate Body case law from the more recent past has given rise
to certain (arguably unfortunate) requirements on the complainant to ‘raise’ or
‘mention’ certain provisions of the covered agreements, even if the burden of proof
under these provisions properly rests on the defendant. One such example is the
Enabling Clause. The Appellate Body has stated that, where a complainant ‘would
have been well aware that the [measure] must comply with the requirements of the
EnablingClause, and that the [defendant]was likely to invoke theEnablingClause in
response to a challenge of inconsistency with Article I’, the complainant must allege
the inconsistency with the Enabling Clause.10 As a result of this (utterly curious)
ﬁnding, the burden of proof under the Enabling Clause remains on the defendant,
but the complainant must, as it were, anticipate that the defendant might rely on this
defense. The complainant must therefore ‘raise’ the Enabling Clause and argue that
the conditions of this defense have not been complied with –without knowing
whether the defendant will actually rely on this provision. These ‘conditional’ claims
and arguments by the complainant, one would assume, must be contained in the
consultations and panel requests in order to be properly before the Panel.
A similar example is the Appellate Body’s decision on Article II of the GATT
1994 in the India–Additional Import Duties dispute. According to this ruling,
a complainant arguing a violation of Article II:1(b) must, depending on the
circumstances, also raise arguments and evidence that the provision is not justiﬁed
under Article II:2(a). This is a provision on which the defendant presumably may or
may not rely – it certainly is unknown at the time the complainant submits its
consultations request.11
One can easily question the wisdom of this case law.12 However, whatever its
merits, given that this case law exists and given that it positively requires the
9 Perhaps the one thing that China could have done differently would have been not to attach the
condition to the statement that it requested consultations with the United States. It could have instead
stated that it was requesting consultations with the United States on a certain measure, namely Section 727;
it then could have alleged that ‘this measure is inconsistent with Article XI of the GATT and, if the United
States were to argue that it is an SPS measure, also with the SPS Agreement’. (This is what complainants in
other disputes have done, see footnote 6.) But are we going to make the admissibility of a consultations
request, and a panel’s jurisdiction, depend on formal aspects of this kind?
10 Appellate Body Report, European Communities –Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences
to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, adopted 20 April 2004, DSR 2004:III, 925, para. 117ff.
(emphasis added).
11 Appellate Body Report, India –Additional and Extra-Additional Duties on Imports from the United
States, WT/DS360/AB/R, adopted 17 November 2008, para. 190.
12 Arguably, this case law (especially the India–Additional Import Duties variant) injects unnecessary
uncertainty and unpredictability into a complainant’s life, and this uncertainty and unpredictability
outweighs any concerns that may have led the Appellate Body to adopt this approach.
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complainant to raise arguments ‘just in case’ the defendant will subsequently rely
on them, it seems hardly an excessive concession towards the complainant to
actually permit a conditional clause in the consultations request (as well as in panel
requests, for that matter).
3. The application of Articles 2.2 and 5.1 to measures such as Section 727
Professor Regan makes an interesting and plausible argument that scientiﬁc
evidence and risk assessment underpinning a country-speciﬁc measure, such as
Section 727, is different from the risk assessment and scientiﬁc evidence that
underlies non-origins speciﬁc measures. Typically, he says, scientiﬁc evidence and
risk assessment concern more generic questions about human or animal virology,
statistics, and epidemiology. As a result, he wonders whether Articles 2.2 and 5.1
‘arguably should not be thought to require the same sort of justiﬁcation for Section
727 that they require for the measures that have given rise to previous SPS cases’,
because ‘“[s]cientiﬁc justiﬁcation” is simply not possible for a measure like Section
727, if by “science” we mean laboratory methods, or extra-laboratory controlled
experiments, or even broader epidemiological and statistical techniques’ for
investigating ‘general questions about nature.’13 Professor Regan nevertheless
also accepts that the evidence underpinning a country-speciﬁc measure like Section
727 deserves to be qualiﬁed as scientiﬁc if one adopts a broader understanding of
science, namely, as ‘a process characterized by systematic, disciplined and objective
enquiry and analysis, that is, a mode of studying and sorting out facts and
opinions’.14
The distinction between country-speciﬁc measures such as Section 727 and more
origin-neutral measures is certainly very relevant. A risk assessment underlying
Section 727, which relates to how China operates its poultry sanitary regime,
cannot be as generic and abstract as statements about, say, the likelihood that
consuming substance X over a period of Y years entails a 1:10,000 probability of
causing cancer. From a litigant’s perspective, the distinction drawn between the
different types of risk assessment is most pertinent, because it makes clear that the
evidence to be gathered for a dispute will be quite different. A challenge to Section
727 should (at least conceptually) involve country-speciﬁc evidence on how China
enforces its laws and regulations, including the relevant sanitary inspection
procedures and other ‘operational’ aspects, and, in the light of these speciﬁc
conditions in China, how likely poultry exported from China is likely to give rise to
human health threats in the United States. Such evidence is of course different from,
for instance, the type of evidence that was at issue in the EC–Hormones dispute
13 Professor Regan’s paper, Section 4.
14 Professor Regan’s paper, Section 4.
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about the general, non-country-speciﬁc risks of consumption of hormone-treated
beef.
At the same time, this distinction would not, in my view, substantially affect the
applicability of Articles 2.2 and 5.1. The term ‘risk assessment’ is arguably broad
enough to encompass all of these different scenarios. A risk assessment within
the meaning of Article 5.1 can be either of a more generic, abstract type (‘does
substance X generate cancer and, if so, under what conditions?’), or of a more
speciﬁc nature (‘how risky is poultry exported from China, given the actual
sanitary circumstances and the manner of administration of Chinese laws ‘on
the ground’’?). There are several good arguments to read the concept of ‘risk
assessment’ sufﬁciently broadly to capture both types of inquiries. A risk
assessment shall serve as the basis for SPS legislation as ‘appropriate to the
circumstances’,15 which arguably suggests a degree of ﬂexibility in the concept
of ‘risk assessment’. Indeed, the Appellate Body has ruled early on that a risk
assessment must go beyond the laboratory setting and take into account ‘the real
world, where people live and work and die’.16 Looking beyond WTO legal texts,
the meaning that the Codex Alimentarius gives to the term ‘risk assessment’ also
appears sufﬁciently broad to encompass matters beyond the laboratory setting,
including the level of sanitation and process controls, handling and packaging by
commercial actors, and similar non-laboratory issues.17 As a result, even accepting
that what counts as risk assessment for a country-speciﬁc measure will be different
from what constitutes a risk assessment for a general, origin-neutral measure, this
does not, in my view, mean that the standard under Articles 2.2 and 5.1 should
be fundamentally different or less exacting when applied to a measure such as
Section 727.
Indeed, even international standards can be country-speciﬁc and process-
orientated. International standards occasionally pertain to detailed operational
aspects of a health regime, including inspection procedures.18 There are also
international standards pertaining to individual countries, or regions thereof.
A good example is determinations by the World Organisation for Animal Health
15 See Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement.
16 Appellate Body Report, EC –Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 187.
17 See for instance the Codex Alimentarius Commission’s Principles and Guidelines for the Conduct of
Microbiological Risk Assessment, CAC/GL-30 (1999), p. 4, which states: ‘Factors that must be considered
for Exposure Assessment include the frequency of contamination of foods by the pathogenic agent and its
level in those foods over time. For example, these factors are inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the
pathogenic agent, the microbiological ecology of the food, the initial contamination of the raw material
including considerations of regional differences and seasonality of production, the level of sanitation and
process controls, the methods of processing, packaging, distribution and storage of the foods, as well as
any preparation steps such as cooking and holding.’ See www.fao.org/docrep/005/y1579e/y1579e05.htm
(last visited 9 November 2011).
18 As an example, see for instance the Codex AlimentariusCode of Hygienic Practice for Milk andMilk
Products or Code of Hygienic Practice for Meat, Food and Agriculture Organization.
314 J A N B O H A N E S
at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745611000474
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:42:13, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available
(the former Ofﬁce International des Epizooties) that categorize countries and
subnational regions into different categories depending on how prevalent a
particular animal disease is in that country and what relevant animal husbandry
practices that country applies (e.g. vaccination). This categorization may also come
with recommendations about suitable measures to be imposed by importing
countries on products from the various categories of regions. These are precisely
the standards that are relevant for the ‘regionalization’ requirement in Article 6
of the SPS Agreement.19 Of course, there always remains the question whether
actual administrative practice in a particular country effectively applies rules and
procedures enshrined in national legislation or in an international standard –which
may be a determination that the importing country may have to do for itself (and
often does, by means of bilateral veriﬁcation visits). All in all, Articles 2 and 5, with
their scientiﬁc evidence and risk requirement and the principled obligation to use
international standards where available, in my view remain fully applicable to
country-speciﬁc measures such as Section 727.
In any event, whatever the proper reading of ‘risk assessment’, it is unlikely that
in the US–Poultry (China) dispute there was much to gain for the United States by
emphasizing that the required evidence, for purposes of Articles 2.2 and 5.1, was
different from previous SPS disputes. The key problem for the United States was
that it had no sufﬁciently strong poultry-speciﬁc evidence that would support
Section 727. What is more, the United States faced an additional problem in that
the Food Safety and Inspection Service (‘FSIS’) had conducted an investigation/
audit conducted by its own agency and had made positive determinations of the
Chinese poultry regime.20 It appears that all subsequent evidence favourable to
the United States’ defensive stance – for instance, critical reports of China’s hygiene
standards in the food sector, in the media and by international organizations –was
generic and not poultry-speciﬁc. The United States seems to have considered that,
whatever other evidence existed, it would not sufﬁciently substantiate Section 727
and/or ‘override’ the previous positive assessment by the FSIS. If that was the
United States’ view of its position, it is understandable that it simply threw up
its hands under Article 5.121 and did not put up much of a serious ﬁght under
19 As an example, see the standards/assessments promulgated by the World Organisation for Animal
Health with respect to foot and mouth disease, http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/ofﬁcial-
disease-status/fmd/ (last visited 9 November 2011).
20 The FSIS concluded, based on its previous on-site audit, that China’s poultry-inspection system was
equivalent to that of the United States for processed foreign poultry products. The FSIS published
notiﬁcation in the Federal Register that it would be adding China to the list of countries eligible to export
processed poultry products not slaughtered in China. The FSIS, again based on a previous on-site audit,
had also made a preliminary decision ﬁnding China’s inspection system for domestically slaughtered
poultry products equivalent to that of the United States. US congressional legislation then precluded any
further steps in these procedures through a series of budgetary measures, of which Section 727 was one.
21 Panel Report, US–Poultry (China), para. 7.185.
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Article 2.2, either.22 Finally, as Professor Regan points out, the United States
was also disinclined, for systemic reasons, to argue for lower standards under
Article 2.2 and 5.1. All this, in my view, explains the United States’ lack of
enthusiasm in defending Section 727 – leaving aside the additional helpful fact that
the measure, in any event, had expired during the early stages of the panel process.
4. Article 4 and ‘equivalence’
Prof. Regan’s reﬂections on Article 4 and the United States’ ‘equivalence’ regime
are very insightful and I am in full agreement. Like him, I believe that it is
highly unlikely that Article 4 was intended to apply to the exclusion of all other
provisions of the SPS Agreement, for the reasons stated by the Panel. The systemic
implications for the SPS Agreement would be detrimental and utterly unwarranted.
One can criticize aspects of the Panel’s interpretative approach,23 but the result is
certainly correct. I strongly doubt that the United States’ lawyers thought for a
minute that they would prevail with this argument.
Furthermore, the distinction between ‘facilitative’ and ‘exclusionary’ regime is a
very useful conceptual tool. Like Professor Regan, I ﬁnd it more likely that the SPS
Agreement envisages the former type of ‘equivalence’ under Article 4. This question
would, of course, be of the utmost systemic importance if indeed, as the United
States argued, Article 4 applied to the exclusion of all other provisions of the SPS
Agreement. In that case, a Member could adopt a ‘banned until proven safe’
(exclusionary) regime as that embodied in the Poultry Products Inspection Act
(PPIA), based on country-wide equivalence, and thereby escape all strictures of the
SPS Agreement other than the very permissively worded Article 4. However, since
Article 4 does not apply in isolation, as the Panel rightly found, the stakes are
somewhat lower.
But, precisely, this is not the end of the interesting story here. The issue goes
beyond the scope of application of Article 4 of the SPS Agreement and beyond
the question of what type of equivalence regimes Article 4 contemplates. The
distinction between ‘facilitative’ and ‘exclusionary’ regime echoes, to some extent,
the interesting relationship between a signiﬁcant number of (exclusionary)
SPS/quarantine regimes and the strict letter of the entire SPS Agreement. In
principle, any SPS measure affecting trade must be either based on scientiﬁc
evidence and a risk assessment, or must at least satisfy the criteria under Article 5.7
as a provisional health measure. However, many WTO Members operate
22 Ibid., paras. 7.195–7.196.
23 See for instance Lukasz Gruszczynski, who argues that the Panel should have explained more
thoroughly the interpretative signiﬁcance of the Decision on the Implementation of Article 4 of the
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures for construing Article 4. Lukasz
Gruszczynski (2011), ‘United States: Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China – Just
Another SPS Case?’, 2:3 European Journal of Risk Regulation, 431, 436.
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‘banned until proven safe’ (exclusionary) SPS/quarantine regimes. Under these
regimes, products are a priori excluded, for purposes of protecting public health
and safety, until the importer has gone through an administrative procedure and
has demonstrated that its particular product is safe. Upon successful completion of
the authorization procedure, importation/marketing can begin. Section 727 and the
Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) are an example of such measures applied
on a country-wide basis. Other existing import regimes apply this principle on a
product-speciﬁc or exporter-speciﬁc basis.24 Professor Regan provides another
hypothetical example of such a regime, operating on an exporter-speciﬁc basis.25
It is not immediately clear where such regimes ﬁt under the SPS Agreement. Can
these regimes be considered to be ‘based on a risk assessment’, as this requirement
has been read by the Appellate Body? Case law requires that a risk assessment be
sufﬁciently speciﬁc to the risk (and the product) at issue. This suggests that the
regulator is banning or otherwise restricting a product because it knows there is
something (potentially) wrong with it. The rationale behind the banning of a
product until proven ‘safe’ by the prospective producer/seller is precisely the
reverse – the regulator feels that it does not know enough about the product, but is
concerned that somethingmight be wrong with it. Of course, as a matter of general
policy, it can make perfect sense to prohibit market participants to import and
market products (including food) as they please, without previous authorization by
the national authorities. This is also why so many WTOMembers have so many of
these ‘exclusionary’ sanitary and quarantine regimes. However, it does require an
at least somewhat expansive reading of the text of the SPS Agreement to bring such
a regime within the fold. Indeed, there is an instance in which a WTO Member
submitted a consultations request implying a challenge to an SPS/quarantine regime
as a whole, on the ground that ‘import of products is a priori prohibited, although
there is no risk assessment’ (the case was later settled).26
One option to ﬁt such regimes under the SPS Agreement is, of course, to read the
notion of risk assessment under Article 5.1 very broadly and generally. Under this
approach, a product-speciﬁc or risk-speciﬁc assessment would not be required.27
This could be done by relying on the ‘as appropriate to the circumstances’ language
in Article 5.1. At ﬁrst, this sits uncomfortably with existing case law on this
provision, including the requirement that a risk assessment be sufﬁciently speciﬁc.
However, the non-product-speciﬁc and non-risk-speciﬁc/multi-risk nature of
24 By way of examples, consider the EU’s GMO regime as well as the EU’s Novel Foods regime; the
Australian quarantine regime for products such as fruits and vegetables; and, of course, the United States’
very own PPIA.
25 Professor Regan’s article, Section 7.
26 See WT/DS287/1, consultations request by the EU against Australia. See also WT/DS270/1 andWT/
DS271/1, consultation requests ﬁled by the Philippines against Australia, which are less explicit than the EU
request, but nevertheless also appear to challenge, inter alia, the Australian quarantine regime as such.
27 I am grateful for a thought-provoking discussion of these questions with my colleague Hunter
Nottage.
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blanket quarantine regimes might justify requiring only a very generic, non-product
speciﬁc and non-risk speciﬁc ‘risk’ assessment (a sort of ‘parallelism’, as it were).
For instance, it might be enough to point to the obvious and widely accepted
fact that foods can carry pathogens, can therefore cause pests, diseases, and
allergies, and such risks are on average exacerbated if, for example, fresh fruits
and vegetables from overseas (with different ecological systems) are introduced
without prior governmental approval. Admittedly, this carries a hint of the
‘theoretical’ risk that the Appellate Body rejected in EC–Hormones, but it might
just do the trick.28
Alternatively, one could attempt recourse to Article 5.7, where the evidentiary
requirements on scientiﬁc justiﬁcation are lower than under Article 5.1. However,
other circumstances are required under Article 5.7 – for instance, the insufﬁciency
of scientiﬁc evidence to perform a risk assessment, the provisional nature of
such measures, and the seeking of additional evidence. One could try to stretch
Article 5.7 sufﬁciently wide to bring the ‘exclusionary’ regimes within the fold, but
problems remain. For instance, the requirement on Members to seek additional
evidence and periodically review the situation may not allow a Member to simply
sit back and wait for exporters to request authorization for their products, as is the
case under some (probably most of) the ‘exclusionary’ quarantine regimes.29
The reason why this legal issue remains unresolved and such regimes have not
been challenged is their widespread use and the concomitant political sensitivity.
Members are happy not to throw stones in their own glass house. Moreover,
most commercial actors are probably also willing to live with such regimes, as
long as they operate reasonably and objectively. Even if such a dispute went
to adjudication, the Panel would no doubt be inﬂuenced by the widespread use
of such blanket ‘banned until proven safe’ quarantine regimes – ruling them
inconsistent under the SPS Agreement would be so problematic that a panel would
probably be instinctively predisposed to stretch the SPS Agreement just enough to
avoid a ruling of inconsistency.
5. Article 5.5 and the ‘appropriate level of protection’
Professor Regan’s central point with respect to the ‘appropriate level of protection’
(‘ALOP’) is that ‘the Panel should have found that the United States’ ALOP, even
with regard to China, was simply “safe”’, if the United States could have plausibly
claimed that it was entitled to believe that Section 727 was necessary to achieve the
same level of protection as required for other supplier countries. Professor Regan
28Appellate Body Report, ECMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/
AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 186.
29 Perhaps one could make the argument that until either some other Member or at least a foreign
producer asks for authorization, there is no way for the importing Member to know that it is restricting
trade in that speciﬁc product. I am indebted for this idea to Professor Don Regan.
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argues that different measures – including different country-speciﬁc measures –may
be necessary to achieve the same level of protection. The Panel should also not
have shifted the burden of proof to the United States to justify Section 727. He
subsequently makes a few critical points also with respect to the Panel’s analysis
under Article 5.5.
I agree with several points of that analysis. It is no doubt true that a WTO
Member can impose different measures with respect to different supplier countries
all the while pursuing the same ‘level of protection’. This is straightforward – by the
same token, for instance, formally different treatment of domestic and foreign
service providers can result in substantively the same treatment, as Article XVII:2 of
the GATS expressly states. A practical example in the SPS context is one I have
described earlier, namely where an animal disease is less prevalent in some
countries (or regions) than in others and where countries practice different animal-
husbandry practices (for instance, vaccination). Faced with such different
circumstances across different supplier countries, WTO Members could impose
different measures on products depending on where these products come from – for
instance, limiting importation only to animals of a certain age, only to certain parts
of animals, only to animal products that have been treated in a particular manner,
etc. Indeed, a number of such import restrictions may ﬁnd direct justiﬁcation in
determinations or standards promulgated by, for instance, the World Organisation
for Animal Health. These measures could, despite their differences, all reﬂect the
very same ‘level of protection’, because the levels of risk vary from country to
country and from region to region.
Moreover, regardless of whether there are differences in level of protection or
not, the burden of proof under Article 5.5 should not shift from the complainant
to the United States simply because the measure at issue is country-speciﬁc. The
existence of different levels of protection must be demonstrated by the complainant.
I therefore agree with Professor Regan’s criticism of the Panel’s oblique statements
on the burden of proof. The Panel stated that:
to prove that such substantially different measures were needed to achieve the
same ALOP, the United States would have to demonstrate that poultry products
from China presented a greater risk than poultry products from other WTO
Members.30
This is an unfortunately cavalier description of the burden of proof. At the same
time, I do not read the Panel as having effectively reversed the burden of proof. The
full context reveals that the Panel had previously determined that Section 727,
applicable only to China, had created a higher level of protection than measures
imposed on other supplier countries. And this was not only because the United
States was applying ‘substantially different measures’ or because Section 727 was
30 Panel Report, US–Poultry (China), para. 7.250.
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country-speciﬁc, as Professor Regan points out. The Panel’s ﬁnding arguably went
beyond that. The Panel had noted that ‘the regular FSIS procedures prohibit
importation of poultry products from a particular country only until that country
has demonstrated that its SPS measures can achieve the ALOP expressed in the
PPIA. However, the effect of Section 727 was to prohibit the importation of poultry
from China in any instance, regardless of whether China demonstrated that its own
SPS measures could achieve the ALOP expressed in the PPIA.’31 This means that,
while all countries but China had ‘at least . . . an avenue . . . to gain access to the
United States market’, no such avenue was available for Chinese poultry
products.32 Hence, in this particular instance, different measures resulted, at least
prima facie, in substantively different levels of protection. What the Panel should
have said was that the complainant had made out a prima facie case and that the
United States could now attempt to rebut this prima facie case by showing that risk
from Chinese poultry products was higher.
Finally, Professor Regan raises a most relevant point about how ‘arbitrariness’
of, and lack of ‘justiﬁcation’ for, differences between levels of protection should be
demonstrated for purposes of Article 5.5 and how the Panel proceeded in this
regard. In a nutshell, the Panel examined whether there was scientiﬁc justiﬁcation
for the different levels of protection and concluded there was none. Speciﬁcally,
there was no risk assessment in support of Section 727 – the same reason for which
the Panel had found a violation of Article 5.1. As a result, the Panel concluded, the
difference in the levels of protection was ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’.33 Professor
Regan’s criticism is that the Panel excessively focused on science as a litmus test for
examining ‘arbitrariness’ or ‘unjustiﬁability’ under Article 5.5. By doing so, the
Panel disregarded the purpose of Article 5.5, which is to identify a type of violation
that can exist even when a risk assessment exists and supports the more protective
measure.
This criticism is entirely correct. It is worth quoting fully the Panel’s
(unfortunate) relevant statement on this point:
we are of the view that the scientiﬁc support, or lack thereof, for the difference
between the ALOPs the measures seek to achieve should have a bearing on
an analysis of whether such a difference is arbitrary or unjustiﬁable under
Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement. Indeed, in the context of Article 5.5 to show
that the distinction in ALOPs is not arbitrary or unjustiﬁable, a Member must
demonstrate that there are differing levels of risk between the comparable
situations. We are of the view that such a demonstration requires scientiﬁc
evidence.
31 Ibid., para. 7.249.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., para. 7.263.
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Several things are problematic with this statement, but let us focus on the
‘scientiﬁc evidence’ requirement.34 This goes to the question of how to assess
‘arbitrariness’ and ‘unjustiﬁability’, which has not been systematically addressed by
the Appellate Body. Professor Regan rightly criticizes the Panel on this point.
The issue is how signiﬁcant scientiﬁc evidence should be for determining whether
differences between levels of protection are ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’. The Panel
transferred previous case law on Article 2.3 and Article XX of the GATT 1994 into
Article 5.5 and found that ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘unjustiﬁability’ would be determined
in relation to the cause of the difference in levels of protection.35
That is not in itself an objectionable approach – even if it is not clear why ‘cause’
should be the exclusive criterion for arbitrariness and why, for instance, the extent
of the difference between levels of protection should not also play a role. It is also
perfectly correct, as the Panel stated, that scientiﬁc evidence can have a bearing on
whether differences between levels of protection are ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’.
The absence of scientiﬁc support for one of the measures, as in the US–Poultry
(China) case, can be highly indicative of ‘arbitrariness’ and ‘unjustiﬁability’. The
difference in the level of protection in this case was pronounced –China was
banned from exporting under any circumstances, whereas all other countries had a
chance of demonstrating equivalence – and there was no scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for
the extra protection applied to China (scientiﬁc evidence actually pointed in the
opposite direction).
34 In addition, I see two other problems. First, there is (yet another) misleading statement on the burden
of proof – clearly, a defending Member does not (initially) have to demonstrate anything, because the
burden of proof is on the complainant. The panel ﬁnding should probably be viewed again in the speciﬁc
context of this case, where there was no scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for Section 727, which to the Panel
apparently amounted to a prima facie case, such that the burden of proof shifted to the United States.
Second, the statement that what should be demonstrated is that there are differing ‘levels of risk’ seems,
strictly speaking, incorrect. What matters under Article 5.5 is whether (1) there are different ‘levels of
protection’ (something conceptually different from the ‘level of risk’), (2) whether the difference between
the levels of protection is ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’, and (3) whether, as a consequence of (1) and (2),
there is discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. A level of risk is given by objective
reality, and is determined in scientiﬁc fashion, whereas the level of protection (tolerated level of risk) is a
policy target deﬁned by the importing Member. Depending on the intrusiveness and restrictiveness of the
measures taken by the importing Member, a level of protection can be anything from zero risk/high level of
protection to medium to low, while the level of risk remains the same. Hence, the Panel’s analysis seems to
be directed at the wrong concept. Even if there are different levels of risk in comparable situations, that does
not per se tell us anything about the respective levels of protection and about whether this difference
deserves the label ‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’.
(Admittedly, when a Member adopts no measure in the face of a particular risk, then the (natural) level
of risk translates directly into a level of protection or a tolerated level of risk. I am grateful to Lukasz
Gruszczynski for highlighting this point to me. At the same time, the conceptual differences between level of
risk and level of protection remain. A level of risk occurs naturally and a level of protection is a policy
choice. Article 5.5 is about comparing these policy choices. So the Panel’s ‘test’ cannot be the general test
under (2)).
35 See, in particular, Panel Report, US–Poultry (China), para. 7.261.
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But the Panel seems to elevate scientiﬁc evidence, or lack thereof, into a generally
applicable and exclusive tool for uncovering arbitrariness and unjustiﬁability. That,
as Professor Regan points out, is conceptually wrong. The reason is simple. Two
distinct measures can be perfectly justiﬁed in scientiﬁc terms, under Articles 2.2 and
5.1, and yet each reﬂect a different level of protection. This difference in the level of
protection may or may not be inconsistent with Article 5.5. This is because the
choice of the level of protection is, at its heart, a risk-management choice – that is,
the policy choice taken on the basis of a risk assessment. In this dichotomy, science
is part only of risk assessment – in contrast, risk management is a policy choice of a
non-scientiﬁc character. Hence, comparing two different levels of protection – each
of which was set in a manner that is not conceptually determined by science –
cannot be a science-driven exercise either.
By way of a short example, assume that a risk assessment (a scientiﬁc study) has
been performed that establishes that intake of (an otherwise very useful) substance
X in the amount of Y over a period of Z years creates a 1:100,000 risk of
developing cancer. A risk manager will now be called upon to make the policy
choice to determine the level of protection. What level of risk is tolerable for
society? What should be the maximum legally permitted level of substance X in a
particular product and what should be the maximum resulting odds of developing
cancer? Is 1:100,000 an acceptable level of risk? Or 1:10,000 or 1:1,000,000? How
does one balance the usefulness of the product/substance against public-health
concerns and human lives? This question is a non-scientiﬁc policy choice. Scientists
are best placed to calculate the odds of developing cancer, but they are not better
equipped than say, politicians, lawyers, economists, accountants, or carpenters on
the issue of why regulation should establish a maximum risk level of 1:100,000
rather than 1:90,000.36
Assume now that parliament has promulgated a rule that implicitly accepts a risk
level of 1:100,000 for substance X. Parliament has also previously regulated
substance S, an entirely different substance, but with similar carcinogenic
properties as substance X. For substance S, parliament has (implicitly or explicitly)
decided that the maximum acceptable risk level is 1:130,000. Keep in mind that
both pieces of legislation – for substance X and substance S – are based on a proper
risk assessment that identiﬁes the type of risk and quantiﬁes it. Both pieces of
legislation are therefore on a sound scientiﬁc footing and are consistent with
Articles 2.2 and 5.1. It is just that in one instance (for substance S ) parliament has
been more risk averse than in the other instance (for substanceX ). As the Appellate
Body has made clear, a difference of this sort may be perfectly normal and
acceptable. ‘[G]overnments establish their appropriate levels of protection
frequently on an ad hoc basis and over time’, and therefore ‘the goal set is not
36 See for instance Jan Bohanes (2002), ‘Risk Regulation in WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach
to the Precautionary Principle’, 40:2 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 323.
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absolute or perfect consistency [in levels of protection]’.37 ‘It is only arbitrary or
unjustiﬁable inconsistencies that are to be avoided’. But in this example, if both
pieces of legislation are in and of themselves scientiﬁcally sound, how could science
tell us whether the difference between the level of protection of 1:100,000 and
1:130,000 is ‘arbitrary’? Plainly, this is a typical qualitative determination that may
depend on a variety of factors, including the extent of the difference, the degree of
similarity between the two scenarios regulated, the target groups protected by the
legislation, the industrial usefulness of the substance involved, and a potentially
endless list of further case-speciﬁc circumstances. The Panel’s statements sit
uncomfortably with what Article 5.5 is about.
The best way of reading the Panel Report is therefore to accept that the Panel was
justiﬁed in considering, in this case, the absence of risk assessment for Section 727
as an indicator that the higher level of protection reﬂected in Section 727 was
‘arbitrary’ or ‘unjustiﬁable’, as compared to the level of protection of the PPIA.
However, I fully agree with Professor Regan that the Panel inappropriately appears
to imply that science should be the exclusive test for ‘arbitrariness’ and
‘unjustiﬁability’ under Article 5.5.
6. Article XX(b) and its relationship to the SPS Agreement
Finally, a few words on the Panel’s ﬁnding under Article XX(b) and its relationship
with the SPS Agreement. Professor Regan criticizes the Panel’s ﬁndings and makes a
series of interesting points. I have sympathy for his criticism and agree that the
Panel leaves numerous questions unanswered, questions that Professor Regan
identiﬁes and discusses in meticulous fashion. At the same time, I ﬁnd also the
Panel’s analysis not implausible38 and do not share all of Professor Regan’s points
of criticism. For instance, I am not certain why the word ‘necessary’ in Article XX
(b) cannot encompass the requirement to ensure that a measure is based on a risk
assessment or, for that matter, certain other (substantial) requirements of the SPS
Agreement.39 Even if the ordinary meaning of ‘necessary’ does not include these
37 Appellate Body Report, ECMeasures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/
AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, adopted 13 February 1998, DSR 1998:I, 135, para. 213.
38 Lukasz Gruszczynski also agrees with the outcome of the Panel’s analysis, even if he criticizes the
Panel’s reasoning. Lukasz Gruszczynski (2011), ‘United States: Certain Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry from China – Just Another SPS Case?’, 2:3 European Journal of Risk Regulation, 431, 437.
39 See Professor Regan’s article, Section 8. ‘No amount of context can make the ‘ordinary meaning’ of
the word ‘necessary’ in GATT XX(b) encompass, say, the requirement to do a risk assessment.’ In my
opinion, assessing whether a measure is ‘necessary’ includes considering the scientiﬁc justiﬁcation of a
measure. In demonstrating such scientiﬁc justiﬁcation under Article XX(b), a WTO Member may rely on
preexisting studies or may have to produce its own scientiﬁc study –which is also choice permissible under
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. Professor Regan also states that ‘‘[n]ecessary’ refers to the relation that
exists between the measure and its goal, whereas the SPS is about requiring speciﬁc techniques for
investigating that relation.’ I am not certain about how this distinction would play out in a dispute – the SPS
Agreement does not necessarily require a WTOMember to perform a risk assessment (a Member can rely
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requirements – since the SPS Agreement declares that it ‘elaborates’ on Article XX
(b), why can the SPS Agreement not be deemed something akin to – loosely
speaking – an ‘authentic interpretation’ of that provision by the GATT/WTO
membership, or, as Professor Regan suggests, to a special meaning of that term,
within the meaning of Article 31.4 of the Vienna Convention?40 (However, in all
fairness, this is not the interpretative methodological approach that the Panel took.)
The word ‘necessary’ would then be (again loosely speaking) deemed to reﬂect the
rules of the SPS Agreement, and ordinary meaning would cease to be the issue.
There are plenty of deeming provisions in WTO law.41
Nevertheless, I also recognize that one could argue that Articles 2.4 and 3.2
demonstrate that, when the drafters wanted to create ‘deeming’ provisions, they did
it expressly, which undermines the argument that the term ‘necessary’ should be
deemed to encompass the SPS Agreement. More broadly, the term ‘necessary’
probably should also not include all aspects of the SPS Agreement – it does seem a
stretch to argue that ‘necessity’ is elaborated by the obligation to create information
points and to notify SPS measures to the SPS Committee prior to their enactment.42
The simple truth is that any deﬁnitive answer on this complex issue will necessarily
be imperfect and leave some concerns unaddressed.
Beyond this admittedly somewhat agnostic statement, I would like to offer the
following additional thoughts.
First, as Professor Regan himself states, the practical implications of the
difference in the Panel’s and Professor Regan’s view are circumscribed. Even if
Article XX(b) remains theoretically available to justify a GATT violation, the
defending Member will still have to remove any inconsistency found to exist under
the SPS Agreement. In other words, even if Article XX(b) remains theoretically
available, and even if it does in a given case actually justify a GATT violation, this
would not absolve the defending Member from bringing itself into compliance
under the SPS Agreement. After all, the Panel did not seek to apply Article XX(b) to
violations of the SPS Agreement.
Second, the Panel’s ﬁnding is interesting for what it might imply for other
questions. There is, for instance, the question I raised under Section 2, namely,
whether an SPS measure must be challenged under the SPS Agreement (with or
without the GATT 1994) or whether a complainant could be permitted to choose
to claim only GATT 1994 violations. The Panel’s approach of essentially fusing
on preexisting studies); it merely requires that a measure be demonstrably scientiﬁcally justiﬁed as assessed
at the time of a dispute settlement proceeding. And, in my view, this is also what an important part of
‘necessity’ under Article XX(b) is about.
40 Prof. Regan’s Article, footnote 53.
41 For instance, the Annex I – Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in the SCM Agreement contains
subsidies that do not ﬁt within the ordinary meaning of the deﬁnition of a subsidy in Article 1 – especially
within the ‘beneﬁt’ prong – but Annex I is a deeming provision, and that is enough.
42 See Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
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Article XX(b) and the SPS Agreement suggests to me that the Panel considers
these two agreements as something akin to the ‘inseparable package of rights
and obligations’ that the Appellate Body saw in Brazil–Desiccated Coconut in
Article VI of the GATT and the SCM Agreement.43 Does this suggest that bringing
a challenge against an SPS measure under the GATT alone is not an option? If
Article XX(b) is fused and joined at the hip with the SPS Agreement such that a
violation of the SPS Agreement precludes invoking Article XX(b), does it make
sense to analyze an SPS measure under the GATT without considering it previously
under the SPS Agreement?
Another tantalizing question is whether the Panel’s reasoning betrays something
on what that Panel thinks of the applicability of Article XX outside of the
GATT – for instance, to the TBT Agreement. Unfortunately, I do not believe that
the Panel Report tells us anything about that. First, as already noted, the US–
Poultry (China) Panel asks a different question – namely, whether Article XX(b)
can justify a GATT violation, not a violation of the SPS Agreement. Second, there
are numerous idiosyncrasies in the relationship between the GATT (and Article XX
(b)) and the SPS Agreement that militate against transferring the Panel’s analysis to,
say, the relationship between Article XX and the TBT Agreement. These
idiosyncrasies are, most importantly, the speciﬁc language in the SPS Agreement
(namely, that the SPS Agreement ‘elaborates’ on Article XX(b)), the safe-haven
clauses under Articles 2.4 and 3.2, and to some degree also the fact that Article XX
(b) is a defense whereas the SPS Agreement contains primary obligations.
43 Appellate Body Report, Brazil –Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/AB/R, adopted
20March 1997, DSR 1997:I, 167, p. 14 (quoting with approval the statement of the Panel in that dispute).
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